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Note
Coordinated-Coalition Bargaining: Theory,
Legality, Practice and Economic Effects
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, collective bargaining structure has been influ-
enced by many factors. Each factor is important to the extent
that it affects to total economic and noneconomic package that
a union is able to negotiate. For example, the market situation
in which negotiations take place is important. Unions generally
try to create structures that are coextensive with the product
markets in which they operate. Thus, a traditional goal of un-
ions is to remove wages from competition by trying to achieve
wage uniformity within a particular market.' The structure of
the bargaining unit will also reflect the specific issue being bar-
gained for. If, for example, the issue is wages, which will usually
have market-wide implications, unions will tend to press for ex-
pansion of the negotiating unit. Decentralized bargaining or-
dinarily occurs if the issue is purely "local."2
Bargaining structures are also influenced by "representa-
tional factors." Work groups generally have two goals which are
somewhat exclusive of each other. One goal is "bargaining
power," the other is "autonomy in decision-making." Unions will
form an alliance or create a common front to achieve greater bar-
gaining strength but at the same time will try to minimize the
loss of autonomy or the destruction of special group interests.
The ultimate balance between these two goals will depend upon
the homogeneity of the membership and the nature of the issues
discussed at the bargaining table. Probably the most important
factor in collective bargaining is the theory of maximizing bene-
fits by inflicting a maximum of real or expected costs on the
other party.3 This usually results in a confrontation of power,
1. Thus, in some industries such as automobile, steel and rub-
ber, "pattern bargaining" has become the norm. Once a new contract
is negotiated with one major employer, the rest of the industry follows
with approximately identical terms. Likewise, formal systems of in-
dustry-wide bargaining have occurred in some industries-coal, rail-
road and trucking to name a few. Here almost all the employers in the
industry associate together to bargain singly with the union.
2. A purely local issue might be the grievance procedure fol-
lowed in the plant or the physical surroundings affecting a worker
within a plant.
3. For a discussion of various theories regarding the maximiza-
tion of monetary benefits see A. CARnrrE & F. MARsHALL, LABOR Eco-
Nomcs: WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, AND TRADE UNiONisM 276 (1967).
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but a balance eventually is struck between the bargaining parties
and a new contract is signed.4
Each of the aforementioned factors can be used in explaining
union tactics in coordinated-coalition bargaining. Before any
concrete examples of actual coordinated-coalition bargaining are
presented, however, a definition of coordinated and coalition bar-
gaining should be framed and the contrasting theories behind
the two should be examined. To an extent, labor, management
and economists look at the issues differently. Although several
authors have discussed coordinated bargaining and coalition bar-
gaining as similar issues,5 there are some fundamental differ-
ences between the two:
Coordinated bargaining consists of an effort to achieve common
bargaining goals by two or more unions who bargain separ-
ately with a common employer for a unit or units of employees
certified by the Board or recognized by the employer, during the
course of which the coordinating unions exchange information
and other technical assistance, including the use on their bar-
gaining committee of persons affiliated with another of the co-
ordinating unions, in preparation for and during such bar-
gaining.6
Coordinated bargaining is joint union bargaining and may have
one or more of the following objectives: common expiration
dates for all bargaining agreements with one employer or sev-
eral employers, similar settlements in contracts with one em-
ployer or several employers, and simultaneous conclusion of ne-
gotiations with one employer or several employers. 7 Coalition
bargaining, on the other hand, is coordinated bargaining with an
added ingredient. In coalition bargaining, unions force willing or
unwilling employers to bargain company-wide or industry-wide
for a master contract covering all employees, thereby destroying
4. Although governmental policy plays an important role in
determining bargaining structure, it has not been included in the dis-
cussion here because it is discussed thoroughly in the text accompany-
ing notes 25-69 infra.
5. See D. Benetar, Coalition Bargaining Under the NLRA, in
TWENTIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 219 (N.Y.U. 1968); A. Ord-
man, Some Major Developments Under the NLRA, in TWENTY-FIRST
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 17, 24 (N.Y.U. 1969).
6. I. Abramson, Coordinated Bargaining By Unions, in TWENTIETH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 231, 233 (N.Y.U. 1968).
7. E. Flynn, The Impact of Coordinated Bargaining on Manage-
ment, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TODAY, Proceedings of the Collective
Bargaining Forum-1969, 71, 72-73 (1970). As Mr. Flynn points out, co-
ordinated bargaining may occur where two or more locals represent
employees of one company, where two or more unions represent em-
ployees of two or more plants of one company or finally, where two or
more unions represent employees of two or more companies. Id.
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the established bargaining units within the company or industry.
The threat of a company-wide strike increases the bargain-
ing strength of all the unions involved by minimizing the
employer's ability to shift production to other non-striking plants
thereby reducing the employer's overall ability to produce and
generate profits."
Coordinated bargaining has been in the eyes of labor an his-
torical necessity prompted by the increased corporate diversifi-
cation of the American economy. Corporate growth and con-
glomerations have taken decision making power further from the
source of the issues so that a union at a local or plant level no
longer has the ability to influence or challenge these decisions.10
Joseph P. Molony, Vice-president of the Steelworkers has said of
this trend:
It has made it impossible in many large companies for any one
union to pull enough employees off the job to cause the com-
pany anything more serious than a minor inconvenience and a
small dent in its total profit .... Once a union cannot hurt a
company by strike, the balance of bargaining strength has
disappeared.1'
With the growth in size of corporations and their expansion into
different industries, the labor movement has acknowledged that
it in turn will create larger unions by merger, or expand via
coordinated-coalition bargaining. The primary goal, of course, is
to increase bargaining power, but the leadership of the Indus-
8. Francis O'Connell, Director of Industrial Relations for the Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corporation in a speech delivered on Dec. 9, 1966
at the N.A.M_ Congress of Industry defines coalition bargaining this
way:
... While purporting to bargain legitimately, ie., only in and
for the established bargaining unit, the unions mass their power
and make it clear to the employer that none will bargain unless
all are bargained with; that none will be satisfied, unless and
until all are satisfied; and, that, unless all are satisfied, all
will (at some point) strike....
So, if the strike is company-wide and an agreement cannot be
reached until a company-wide coalition of unions is satisfied,
we have, not withstanding the law a company-wide negotia-
tion in a situation in which the lega bargaining unit may only
be a single plant.
9. A. Weber, Stability and Change in the Structure of Collective
Bargaining, in CHALTLNGEs To CoLLEcmE BARGAINING 13, 26-28 (L. Ulmen
ed. 1967).
10. See Conway and Ginsburg, The Extension of Collective Bar-
gaining to New Fields, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL
MEETING, Industrial Relations Research Assn., Dec. 1966, 303, 304.
11. J. Molony, Coordinated Bargaining-the Union and Manage-
ment, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TODAY. Proceedings of the Collective
Bargaining Forum-1969, 65, 69 (1970).
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trial Union Department of the AFL-CIO 12 has determined that
four other results will be forthcoming: coordinated bargaining
will lead to "a great growth in organizing"13 because it indicates
where union strength must be focused to contend with conglom-
erates; it will increase the need for computerization and data
processing to handle company figures and data; it will allow un-
ions to "[divide] up a pie of economic abundance instead of fight-
ing over a pie of scarcity" 14 as it eliminates or lessens jurisdic-
tional disputes among the various unions; and finally, the strug-
gle in negotiations will have the backing of the whole labor
movement rather than a particular small segment.
Management has generally taken the approach that its inter-
ests coincide with those of individual employees to the extent
that coordinated bargaining moves the decision-making process
a step higher by centralization of power. Management claims
this has lessened the importance of local issues and grievances
causing not only numerous disputes over plant administration
and work rules, but also making it more difficult for union lead-
ers to sell agreements to locals. This in turn makes it more dif-
ficult for management to reach agreement with national union
leaders.' 5 Management cites cases where unions have undergone
internal dissension because of "local" revolts against interna-
tional leadership and overcentralization. 6 However, the real
management complaint comes down to the issue of union power:
Conducting . . . negotiations on issues extraneous to the inter-
ests of a compny or a particular plant within a company in-
evitably results in agreements that threaten the economic via-
bility of that plant or company and, hence, the livelihood of its
employees. 17
Management's response to coordinated-coalition bargaining has
12. The Industrial Union Department is the major agency in-
stigating and carrying out the procedures of coordinated-coalition bar-
gaining.
13. Conway and Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 303.
14. Id. See also Lasser, Coordinated Bargaining: A Union Point
of View, 19 LAB. L.J. 512 (1968); Note, Coordinated Bargaining: The
Unions' Attempt to Answer a Need, 3 U. OF SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 353
(1969).
15. Farmer, Collective Bargaining in Transition, Industrial Rela-
tions Counselors Research Monograph No. 27, 47 (1967). See also Engle,
Coordinated Bargaining: A Snare-and a Delusion, 19 LAB. L.J. 518,
523 (1968).
16. Among those cases noted are the overturn of top leadership
in the United Steelworkers of America, and the split on the West
coast by the pulp and paper workers to form a new independent na-
tional to promote regional interests. Farmer, supra note 15, at 48.
17. Id.
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been to endure strikes rather than to submit to more costly set-
tlements and adverse competitive positions. Management also
contends that coordinated-coalition bargaining has forced it to
conduct negotiations at a higher level, that is, more removed
from individual plants. Finally, coordinated-coalition bargain-
ing has forced management to increase labor litigation and to ex-
ert greater pressure for legislative reform.Is
A third view is held by some economists who characterize
coordinated-coalition bargaining as an attempt to "rationalize the
historical incongruities or weakness of trade union structure and
jurisdiction."' 9 Thus, the AFL-CIO through its Industrial Union
Department has created a "supra-national union" to overcome
such inadequacies. These economists differ from employers in
their conclusions to the following extent. Although both recog-
nize coordination as a bid for more union power, employers be-
lieve that it arises from an already over-powerful movement
while economists believe it arises from bargaining weaknesses.2 0
For example, several internationals in the same industry may be
dealing with different plants competing in the same product
market. If coordination did not arise, each of the internationals
and plants would probably have different wage settlements,
causing certain plants to operate at lower costs (partly because
of lower wage settlements) which would affect employment and,
consequently, the power of the union to gain concessions.2  A
single corporation might have several plants organized by several
unions, each with separate contracts and different termination
dates. To the extent that one plant duplicates the production of
another, a strike against one of the plants would shift produc-
tion to another without significantly disrupting the company's
operations. If coordination can bring about common expiration
dates, or at least common strike agreements, 22 the company
will feel the full wrath of a strike and will likely settle for a
larger package.2 3 Finally, corporate conglomerates with diverse
plants and product lines are in an obviously better position to
force plant-by-plant local bargaining.-24
18. E. Flynn, supra note 7, at 76-79.
19. A. Weber, supra note 9, at 27.
20. Hildebrand, Coordinated Bargaining: An Economist's Point of
View, 19 LAB. L.J. 524, 525 (1968).
21. Id.
22. A common strike agreement consists of one union striking un-
til all other union contracts are terminated so that all unions are on
strike. This creates a united front.
23. Hildebrand, supra note 20, at 525.
24. Id. at 526. To the extent that unions bargaining in a con-
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H. THE LEGALITY OF COORDINATED-COALITION
BARGAINING
To evaluate the legality of coordinated-coalition bargaining,
it is most fruitful to delineate the scope of lawful union activity.
A recent labor controversy involving the General Electric Com-
pany,25 discussed in more detail later in this Note,20 provides a
good starting point.
Approximately 80,000 employees of General Electric are rep-
resented by the International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers (IUE) in 90 bargaining units. General Electric
and the IUE have in the past bargained on a national basis for
a contract covering all 90 units of the IUE. The 1963-1966 con-
tract was due to expire on October 2, 1966. Prior to that time,
the IUE and other unions representing employees of General
Electric formed a Committee on Collective Bargaining (CCB) to
coordinate bargaining and to formulate national goals in bar-
gaining with General Electric. The CCB made several unsuccess-
ful attempts to have General Electric meet with it for joint dis-
cussions on several matters, presumably in the place of prelim-
inary discussions with the IUE alone. However, on April 13, 1966,
the chairman of the IUE General Electric Conference Board and
the manager of the General Electric Employee Relations Service
discussed the possibility of a meeting to formulate rules for sub-
committee meetings. The IUE representatives stated at that
time that the IUE would not seek joint bargaining. The General
Electric representative agreed to the meeting which was set for
May 4, 1966.
On May 4, the Company discovered the addition of seven
members to the IUE negotiating committee consisting of one
member each from the other seven unions comprising the CCB.
The Company refused to meet with the IUE even with knowledge
that the seven were non-voting members, there solely to aid the
IUE in negotiations and not there to represent their own indi-
vidual unions.
The IUE filed failure to bargain charges 27 which eventually
glomerate situation are "fragmented and decentralized," a strike will
be ineffective because an employer does not have to worry about a
strike at any one plant because the other plants of the employer will
produce different products and will bargain with different unions.
25. General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969).
26. See Section 2 of Part III infra.
27. See 412 F.2d at 515-16.
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were sustained by an NLRB decision in October, 1968.28 The
Board sustained the Union's contention that General Electric by
its refusal to bargain with the IUE had violated section 8 (a) (5)
of the Labor Management Relations Act.29 The Board, limiting
its holding to the facts of the case, found that General Electric
had violated the Act by refusing to bargain with the IUE Com-
mittee which included representatives from other unions. The
Board held that a union has the right to select the members of
its bargaining team to represent it in negotiations. The Board
stated, "General Electric left the negotiating table before nego-
tiations began, and, therefore, before it had any opportunity to
determine whether the IUE Committee had, as it professed, come
to negotiate an agreement only for the IUJE."3 0 The Board
avoided two of the more important coordinated-coalition bargain-
ing questions: whether a refusal to bargain may be justified if,
in fact, the participating unions are "locked in" to a conspiratorial
understanding to bring about company-wide coalition bargaining
and whether a refusal to bargain may be justified if it becomes
apparent that outside representatives are seeking to bargain for
their own unions, rather than for the principal union involved in
the bargaining.
The court of appeals upheld the Board on the General Elec-
tric violation. The crucial issue as the court saw it was the right
of either side to choose its bargaining representatives freely.
The court cited section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act
which guarantees to employees the right to join together in labor
organizations and "to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing .. . ."31 Either side may choose its
representatives as it sees fit and neither side may interfere with
the other's selections.3 2 The exceptions to this general rule have
been confined to cases where ill will or conflict of interests are so
great as to make good faith bargaining impractical. 33
28. General Electric Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 69 L.R.R.M. 1305
(1968).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
30. General Electric Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 69 L.RlR.M. 1305,
1306 (1968).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
32. See Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 40, 44 (6th Cir. 1963);
McLeod v. General Electric Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 701-02 (S.D. N.Y.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966); American
Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. v. NLRB, 381 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.
1967).
33. See Kennecott Copper Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 75 (1952); Douglas
Aircraft Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 486, 489 (1943). See, e.g., NLRB v. ILGWU,
274 F.2d 376, 379 (3rd Cir. 1960); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108
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The court relied upon Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB3 4 where
four oil refineries of the same company constituted separate bar-
gaining units, one represented by the international and the others
by three of its locals. The bargaining committee for each refin-
ery added representatives of the other three bargaining units.
The Company objected on the ground that the outside representa-
tives were involved in a plot to bring about company-wide coali-
tion bargaining. The NLRB accepted the union's disclaimer of
such intention, and in enforcing the Board's order the Sixth Cir-
cuit stated: "Absent any finding of bad faith or ulterior motive
on the part of the Unions we conclude that it was the duty of the
Company to negotiate with the bargaining committees of the
Unions .... "35 In the General Electric case, the Second Circuit
reaffirmed the reasoning of the Standard Oil decision but did not
hesitate to point out, as did the court in Standard Oil, that "if the
expanded bargaining committees actually had tried to force a
single bargaining for the four units, the employer could properly
have resisted. 36
The Company in General Electric made four attacks on the
Board rule allowing mixed-union negotiating committees. The
claim that outside influences and alleged conflicts of interest
would be injected was dismissed by the court on the basis of
precedent.3 7 On the Company's assertion that the Board had
made an improper adjustment of economic power, the court held
that the Board had not stated this to be the rationale of its deci-
sion, and although the IUE's purpose was to increase its bargain-
ing strength, the fact that such a purpose was incidentally ac-
complished did not vitiate the rule if otherwise justified. 8 The
court evaded the Company assertion that to determine the mo-
tives of the union was an impossible task. Although recognizing
the possibility of improper attempts by the union to ignore unit
boundaries in bargaining, the court was unwilling to deal with
the question of how far the law permitted bargaining cooperation
among separately certified units and was satisfied to leave this
determination to the Board. The court stated:
We agree that a mixed-union committee could make it easier to
press [bargaining for employees in other units] illegally. ...
Nevertheless, cooperation between unions is not improper up
N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954); NLRB v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 182 F.2d 810
(6th Cir. 1950).
34. 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963).
35. Id. at 44.
36. General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 1969).
37. Id. at 519.
38. Id.
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to a point and it is for the Board in the first instance to deter-
mine whether the line has been crossed.39
The critical question in the area of coordinated-coalition bar-
gaining, then, is how much cooperation is too much? It is fairly
certain that the parties can negotiate on a coalition basis-bar-
gain jointly for a common "master agreement"-if both the em-
ployer(s) and union(s) agree.40  But the real problem arises
when an employer refuses to bargain under such an arrangement
and the union insists on the coalition issue to the point of im-
passe.
Section 8 (b) (3)41 of the Act requires the union to bargain
with the employer as long as it represents the employees in the
unit. Section 9(a) states that the union chosen by the majority
of the employees in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining
"shall be the exclusive representative (s) of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment .... '142 Section 9(a) taken alone does not prima
facie preclude a bargaining representative from demanding that
the employer negotiate common demands jointly with that unit
and another union representing a separate unit. An employer's
39. Id. at 520. In Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v.
NLRB, 415 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1969), decided after the General Electric
case, the court also upheld the enforcement of a Board order finding
that 3M violated § 8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act in refusing to meet and
negotiate with representatives of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Work-
ers Union (OCAW), AFL-CIO, which included representatives of other
unions invited to attend the negotiations for the purpose of partici-
pating in the discussions and advising the Union. The OCAW made it
clear that the "outsiders" would be a part of the OCAW Bargaining
Committee negotiating only for the OCAW. The Company contended
that the arrangement was a "ploy" to negotiate major economic items
on a company-wide level but the court stated, "We do not feel that
3M's disapproval of the composition of the Union Bargaining Commit-
tee justified its refusal to bargain even though the presence of two
'outsiders' permits an inference that there might be cooperation among
various unions." 415 F.2d at 178.
40. McLeod v. General Electric Co., 257 F. Supp. 690, 705 (S.D.
N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966); Engle,
Coordinated Bargaining: A Snare-and a Delusion, 19 LAB. L.J. 518
(1968); Wagner, Multi-Union Bargaining: A Legal Analysis, 19 LAB. L.J.
731, 733-34 (1968); Goldberg, Coordinated Bargaining Tactics of Unions,
54 CoRN L L. REv. 897, 915 (1969).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (3) (1964):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents -(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the
provisions of section 159(a) of this title;
42. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
duty to bargain, however, originates under section 8(a) (5) 4 3
which requires the employer to bargain only with the majority
representative of an appropriate unit of his employees and with
no other.
An employer confronted with coalition bargaining can make
two arguments based on section 8(a) (5). First, he can argue
that the coalition of unions is an inappropriate bargaining unit
for his employees since the Board has designated separate units
for collective bargaining, and for a union to insist on joint bar-
gaining on a multi-plant basis would defeat that designation
and blur unit boundaries. 4 4 The union has two counter argu-
ments. It may assert that the previous determination of the ap-
propriate unit by the Board is in fact incorrect, and that in reality
the appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes is larger,
covering several plants rather than the single plant which the
Board would generally find appropriate. 4 5 The union might also
argue that even though the coalition of unions is an inappropriate
bargaining unit, two separate unions representing separate bar-
gaining units may properly discuss common demands jointly.
Because a combined unit might be inappropriate for collective
bargaining purposes, it does not necessarily follow that a de-
mand for joint bargaining is inappropriate. 46 Under this theory,
chosen representatives of each unit would still act for their re-
spective units, but demand that the employer discuss demands
common to both units jointly. This, of course, is no longer coali-
tion bargaining because the two unions are no longer bargaining
jointly for a common master agreement but for individual unit
contracts containing similar terms. Thus, theoretically, the same
bargaining result can be obtained as with coalition bargaining
although different means are used.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964):
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representa-
tives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159 (a)
of this title.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964) states:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: ...
45. See Id. and Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678,
683-84 (1944). For factors considered in determining the appropriate
bargaining unit see Hall, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a
Balance Between Stable Labor Relations and Employee Free Choice,
18 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 479, 481-504 (1967).
46. See generally NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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The employer can argue that under section 9(a) of the Act
the elements bargained for in a coordinated bargaining scheme
are not subjects properly includable under "conditions of em-
ployment" and are thus outside the scope of mandatory bargain-
ing.47 Under section 8 (b) (3) it would be unlawful for the union
or bargaining representative to press a non-mandatory subject
of collective bargaining to an impasse.48 However, United States
Pipe and Foundry v. NLRB 49 stands in the path of the section
9(a) employer argument and, depending on what the decision ac-
tually stands for, can lead to opposite conclusions. The Fifth
Circuit was there confronted with the problem of whether unions
representing separate plant bargaining units and negotiating in-
dividual contracts with the same employer could insist that the
termination dates of the individual contracts being bargained
be on the same date. The issue was a simple one-whether a de-
mand that an employer agree to a common expiration date in his
contracts with representatives of other bargaining units is a man-
datory subject of bargaining includable under section 9(a) "con-
ditions of employment." The answer, however, has led to differ-
ent possibilities. The court held that a common expiration date
was a mandatory subject of bargaining, reasoning that identical
contract termination dates at each plant "had a vitally important
connection with the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment" of the units at the other plants because "[w]ith
a common expiration date, it is obvious that each union might
be able to negotiate a more advantageous new contract for the
employees represented by that union," 50 since the employer
would no longer be able to shift production to other plants to
absorb the impact of a strike at one of the plants.5 '
47. See U.S. Pipe and Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 873, 877-78
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 914 (1962). See also Fibreboard v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 153 N.L.R.B. 443 (1965); Goldberg, supra note
40, at 916.
48. See Longshoremens' Ass'n v. NLRB, 277 F.2d 681 (D.C.C.A.
1960); NLRB v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 203 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1953);
Compton v. Carpenters Union, 220 F. Supp. 280 (D.C.P.R. 1963); Wag-
ner, supra note 40, at 739.
49. 298 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962).
50. Id. at 877.
51. It should be noted, however, that a union still cannot bargain
to an impasse on an issue which affects only the bargaining position of
another unit. Thus, a union engaged in multi-plant coordinated bar-
gaining can demand as a condition to agreement only certain terms and
conditions of employment in contracts at other plants if its own bar-
gaining power is increased. Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 40
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The decision carried to its logical extreme could lead to some
startling results. As one commentator suggested, "It does not
take a syllogist to recognize that carried to its logical conclusion
the Sixth [sic] Circuit's analysis would permit unions to achieve
the functional equivalent of multi-plant coalition bargaining by
negotiating on a coordinated basis. ' ' 52 The reasoning behind this
is that common wages, hours and other working conditions would
all be important to each bargaining unit because unions at one
plant would still have to "bail with a sieve" while production was
maintained at other plants, if the employer was still in a position
to play one union off against the other. The bargaining power of
one union would still depend upon the wages, hours and working
conditions negotiated by other unions representing different
units. An employer could agree to higher terms in one plant and
then use the productive capacity of that plant to defeat the bar-
gaining tactics of the other unions at the other plants.
Management has made two criticisms of the scope of the deci-
sion. The first is that the underlying rationale of the opinion,
that a union's bargaining power is increased, depends on similar
contract agreements demanded by all the unions involved and on
mutual reciprocity by all the unions to common contract expira-
tion. Both of these, it is contended, are conclusory statements
and, therefore, "the increase in bargaining power perceived by
the court . . . would not result from common expiration dates as
such nor a single union's ability to insist adamantly upon them,
but rather from the fact that the unions involved could be ex-
pected to engage in coordinated bargaining thereby conferring
additional bargaining power upon one another. ' ' 3  The second
criticism is that the Fifth Circuit has expanded section 8(d)5 4 so
far as practically to approve multi-plant bargaining without em-
ployer consent or Board proceedings to determine the appropriate
unit.55
The union response has been that the underlying rationale
of the United States Pipe and Foundry Co. case is not only sound,
(6th Cir. 1963). See Wagner, supra note 40, at 740. For the argument
against this position see notes 57-59 and accompanying text infra.
52. Wagner, supra note 40, at 741.
53. Id. at 741-42.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964):
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment. . . . (emphasis
added).
55. Wagner, supra note 40, at 741.
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but that it should even be expanded. Not only have unions opted
for agreements whereby several unions bargaining with the same
employer agree that none will sign a contract for less than the
agreed upon terms without the consent of the other unions,16
but also agreements whereby the union, although getting the
agreed upon terms, refuses to sign until the other bargaining
units attain the same results.5" The justification for this position
is that "[t] he employees in each unit have a direct and immediate
interest in the terms and conditions of employment in every
other unit since a low scale of wages and benefits in one unit will
tend to depress these items in all units."5  The legality of such
action is based on the section 7 right to strike for other employees
of the same employer even though in a different bargaining
unit,59 and that such a strike does not violate the secondary
boycott section of the Act, 8 (b) (4) .0
This brings into issue the whole problem of the simultane-
ous strike.61 The difficulty in arranging a simultaneous strike is
that the unions must secure common expiration dates in their
contracts with an employer. This is particularly difficult be-
cause most agreements contain "no strike" clauses. For such a
tactic to be effective, moreover, each union must insist that it
will not return to work until the unions at the other plants have
secured satisfactory agreements. 62 This amounts to conditioning
56. See Goldberg, supra note 40, at 904. This type of agreement
was upheld in Standard Oil Co. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963)
allowing the unions to coordinate their bargaining such that there
would be a common front against the Company. Certain common de-
mands were imposed upon Standard by the unions bargaining in-
dividually, although they had agreed to the common terms formulated
by a Council composed of a number of the locals in Company plants.
57. Id. at 907. The Standard Oil Co. case, 137 N.L.R.B. 690, enf. 322
F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963), disallowed this agreement on the rationale that
once the bargaining unit reaches an agreement (i.e., the terms offered
by the Company to it are acceptable) it has a duty to sign the written
contract. The interesting point about the case is how United States
Pipe and Foundry Co. is distinguished. Although deciding that that
case was inapplicable to the Standard Oil situation, the court seemed to
imply that if the unions had raised the issue of refusing to sign until
all unions were offered the common demands at all plants, at the bar-
gaining table before or during negotiations, the demand might have
been a proper or mandatory subject of bargaining under section 9(a)
and the United States Pipe and Foundry Co. case.
58. Goldberg, supra note 40, at 907.
59. Id. at 908 and cases cited.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1964). See id. and cases cited.
61. A simultaneous strike occurs when all or most of the unions
in a bargaining relationship strike at the same time. The reasons for
such a strike are discussed in Part I of the Note.
62. This, of course, is to prevent employer "whipsawing" which
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agreement at one unit upon agreement at other bargaining units.
It is clear that employees in one bargaining unit have a section 7
right to strike in support of fellow employees in any other bar-
gaining unit of the same employer. 63 However, the cases grant-
ing supportive strikes are those where one group of employees
strikes in support of the demands of employees in another bar-
gaining unit. The type of strike here envisioned would be for
employees in one unit to strike for demands in another unit, and
at the same time, employees of the latter unit to strike for
demands of the former unit. Thus, the strike would serve two
purposes: improvement of the immediate benefits to the first
unit and added support to the strike occurring at the second unit.
A strike to achieve better benefits in one's own unit is clearly
protected as would be a strike for employees in another unit.
The section 7 right to strike for another unit as well as to
strike for one's own demands would become important at the be-
ginning of the negotiating session when the union would resist
the demand by an employer that the agreement contain a "no
strike" clause. This would be accomplished by the union's insist-
ence that it will not waive the section 7 right to strike in support
of fellow employees, although itself willing to complete negotia-
tions and to sign a contract. 64 Upon a company's refusal to sign
such a contract, the union could refuse to sign any contract until
the objectives of the supportive strike had been accomplished.
The unions' refusal to waive the section 7 right to engage in sup-
portive strikes would be a mandatory subject of bargaining, not
violative of section 8 (b) (3). The argument could be made that
the unions' demands for simultaneous settlements relate to mat-
ters "extraneous" to each individual bargaining unit, but United
States Pipe and Foundry Co. v. NLRB 65 again precludes this con-
would weaken the bargaining power of the group of unions acting as a
whole.
63. Texas Foundries, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1642, 1683 (1952), enf. de-
nied on other grounds, 211 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1954); Houston Insulation
Contractors' Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 664 (1967). See also NLRB v. Peter
Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (1942).
64. Employers would be reluctant to sign such a contract because
if they were to sign, the particular unit involved would not be required
to return to work but could engage in "supportive" strikes even though
under a new contract.
65. 298 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1962). There the court noted in
discussing the situation where the representatives of several bargaining
units agree on the same demand and make the same demand upon the
employer in each separate bargaining relationship:
That expansion [of the bargaining unit] is more apparent than
real, for the very real, hard problem faced by each of the three
unions, acting as the exclusive representative of the employees
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clusion. It would seem that if demands for common contract
expiration dates are mandatory subjects of bargaining, then un-
ions should also be entitled to end their strikes together.60
Only the Standard Oil Co.67 case arguably could make the
foregoing union activity illegal. There, two of four bargaining
units of Standard Oil reached agreement, and then announced
that they would not sign the agreements until settlement was
reached at a third unit. None of the unions advised the employer
during negotiations that its signing might be conditioned upon
settlements being obtained elsewhere. This was held unlawful
by the Board. The Sixth Circuit in distinguishing the case from
United States Pipe and Foundry stated:
In our case the Unions did not even bring the subject of agree-
ment at Toledo up for discussion at the bargaining table. They
imposed agreement at Toledo as a condition after agreements
were reached at Cleveland and Lima and without having previ-
ously conferred with the employer about it.08
Although the decision may be read to hold unlawful a union's
belated introduction of the simultaneous settlement issue, there is
language in the opinion that such a demand would be extraneous
to a particular union's bargaining demands and therefore would
not constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining.69
As can be seen, the legal issues involved in coordinated-coali-
tion bargaining are complex and indefinite with many questions
yet unresolved. Possibly more important than the legal issues,
however, is the context in which they arise. The next section of
the Note explores the context in which the issues of coordinated-
coalition bargaining arise, and also the economic repercussions
in its unit, is that a common expiration date for all three con-
tracts vitally affects the ability of each union separately to
bargain.
This is likewise buttressed by the fact that if supportive strikes are
protected activity, the exercise of that right-and refusal to sign an
agreement waiving it--could not be "extraneous."
66. See Evening News Ass'n, 166 N.L.R.B. No. 6: Weyerhauser
Co., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 7. In each of these cases, employers had agreed
among themselves that if one were struck the others would lock-out in
support of that employer. The effect of the agreement was to exert the
combined bargaining pressure of several employers in several bargain-
ing units against a single union in order to enhance the bargaining
power of the struck employer. The Board held that employers, not in a
multi-employer bargaining unit, could lock out their employees. See
also Goldberg, supra note 40, at 909-10.
67. 137 N.L.R.B. 690, enf. 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963).
68. 322 F.2d at 45.
69. Id. "The logic of the Board in support of this conclusion is
that the Toledo issue was an extraneous matter imposed upon the
Company after agreements had been reached at Cleveland and Lima."
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and impact that these issues have on both the collective bargain-
ing process and third parties.
III. CASE STUDIES IN COORDINATED-
COALITION BARGAINING
Because of limitations in space the following case studies
will be limited to two select industries. The copper industry and
the copper strike of 1967-1968 will be examined because it magni-
fies clearly the objectives and pitfalls of coordinated-coalition
bargaining. The bargaining at General Electric will be examined
because of the litigation it has produced and because it exempli-
fies to the fullest extent the union struggle against a powerful,
diverse, large-scale enterprise.
A. THE COPPER STRIKE
Of all the cases that could be presented, the lengthy strike
in the nonferrous metal industry most clearly illustrates the
strategies and techniques used by management and unions in the
bargaining process.
The "nonferrous" or copper industry is dominated by four
companies: Kennecott Copper Corporation, 70 Anaconda Com-
pany,7 1 Phelps Dodge Corporation72 and American Smelting and
Refining Corporation.7 3 These four account for 80 to 90 percent
of the total mining, smelting and refining of copper in the United
States.7 4 Copper is of great importance to the American econ-
omy, being used in its elemental form, in alloys and in almost all
the water tubing and electrical wiring made. Its strategic im-
portance is attested by the federal government's establishment of
a "national stockpile" and reservation of 10 to 29 percent of all
United States copper production for defense purposes.7 5
70. Kennecott is one of the two largest producers of copper in the
world, employing an average of nearly 29,000 people, and having a net
income before depletion of about $165 million in 1969. FORTUNE, May
1970, at 188-89.
71. Anaconda is one of the largest producers of copper in the
world, and the third largest in the United States, employing an average
of nearly 44,000 people, and having a net income of about $99 million in
1969. Id. at 186-87.
72. Phelps Dodge is the second largest domestic producer of cop-
per, employing an average of nearly 18,000 people, and having a net
income of $89 million in 1969. Id. at 188-89.
73. American Smelting and Refining is the fourth largest domestic
producer of copper, employing an average of 13,400 people, and having
a net income of $100 million in 1969. Id.
74. W. CHERNISH, COALITION BARGAINING 169 (1969); Timmins, The
Copper Strike and Collective Bargaining, 21 LAB. L.J. 28, 29 (1970).
75. W. CHERNISH, supra note 74, at 169.
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Originally, the two principal unions in the copper industry
were the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers
and the United Steelworkers. There are also several craft unions
with bargaining rights. The Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers
were known throughout their history to have had radical lean-
ings and were constantly harassed by rival unions, especially the
Steelworkers, United Mine Workers, Teamsters and other craft
unions. 76 The fact that there were 26 different internationals in
copper may-have been the major factor in causing the coordinated
bargaining push in the industry. One of the major union com-
plaints about the industry was that each company was trying to
gain labor cost advantages over its competitors and also cost ad-
vantages within each of the company's own plants. By union
fragmentation, the companies achieved different wage scales in
most of the plants, different rates for the same job in the same
plant and different rates among the unions in the industry.77
Early in 1967 the Steelworkers announced the merger of the
Steelworkers and the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers which
would become effective July 1, 1967, about the same time that
most of the agreements in the industry would expire.78
The bargaining relationships existing in the industry con-
sisted of various forms of joint bargaining. This occurred be-
cause the War Labor Board, during World War 1H, had granted
several separate bargaining units the same termination dates.
Since then, although joint bargaining has occurred, the compa-
nies have maintained separate contracts with each bargaining
unit.79
76. The Mine, Mill and Smelter workers having become CIO
members in 1935 were thereafter accused of Communist infiltration and
were expelled from the CIO in 1950. From then on the union decayed
both financially and in membership. See id. at 173-75.
77. J. Molony, Coordinated Bargaining-the Union and Manage-
ment, in.CoLLEc=v BARGAINING TODAY, Proceedings of the Collective
Bargaining Forum-1969, 65, 66 (1970).
78. W. CHERNisH, supra note 74, at 175.
79. Id. at 176. For instance, Phelps Dodge and Anaconda bar-
gained for separate properties consisting of integrated operations in
joint sessions, the former negotiating separate but similar contracts,
the latter negotiating on an individual or multiple unit arrangement.
American Smelting and Refining saw 12 locals band together in a
confederation to negotiate similar settlements, and because they had
common termination dates, ASARCO had problems in forging different
agreements among the 12 locals. However, ASARCO never engaged injoint bargaining and the agreements did reflect differences in geogra-
phy. Kennecott went furthest in coordinated bargaining, bargainingjointly with unions on a four-division basis covering four different
mining and processing locations. Id. at 175-79.
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When the Steelworkers absorbed the Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers, the scene was set for a show of strength by the new
merger and the copper industry was chosen as the first major test
of industry wide coordinated-coalition bargaining. The major un-
ion complaint was that the bargaining units in the industry were
so fragmented that a strike at one plant of a company was fruit-
less because the company could shift production to other plants
not on strike. This allowed the company to wait out the union
by operating non-struck facilities more extensively, thereby
weakening the union's bargaining position.8 0 A related problem
was the wage scale within the industry. The unions were partic-
ularly concerned about the wide divergences in wage scales,"' and
the lack of "[mlutually agreed-on job classification programs
.... , In late October, 1966, the Industrial Union Department
of the AFL-CIO held a major meeting in Chicago8" to make "a
detailed analysis of the operations, financial analysis, plant loca-
tions and organizational status, contract analysis, and pension
examinations for each of 10 companies which it included in its
definition of the nonferrous industry. '8 4 The meeting also served
to sell the virtues of coordinated-coalition bargaining. A later
conference was scheduled by the Steelworkers and Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers for March, 1967. In the interim the Steelwork-
ers and Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers had requested wage,
pension and other data of the companies to prepare for effective
bargaining, but claimed that one company refused to supply data
and that another company's information was totally inadequate.8 0
At the second conference, the "1967 Non-Ferrous Bargaining Pol-
icy Goals" were formulated and included industry-wide uniform-
ity on all issues and joint bargaining involving all the interna-
tionals with bargaining rights at the companies.8 0 The major
thrust, however, was the demand for a master contract at each
company:
80. J. Molony, supra note 77, at 66.
81. For instance, minimum rates at ASARCO's 20 operations
ranged from $2.18 per hour to $2.66 per hour. Phelps Dodge showed a
range of minimum rates for similar plants from $1.40 per hour to $2.07
per hour. Id. at 67.
82. Id.
83. Included at the conference were representatives from both ma-jor unions, the United Auto Workers, the International Association of
Machinists, the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO and sev-
eral other unions.
84. W. CHERNISH, supra note 74, at 180.
85. Timmins, supra note 74, at 29-30.
86. Id. Other demands included a cost-of-living escalator clause,
substantial wage and salary changes, equalization of rates, job and
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[The non-ferrous companies] should now convert these [single
economic settlements for several plants] to full company-wide
master agreements including coverage of all subsidiary units
... All agreements in each Company and in the industry
should bear a common termination date and should provide for
automatic inclusion of newly certified or recognized units.87
Bargaining began in early May, 1967, with sessions marked
by bargaining committees of coalition union representatives and
demands that the policies formulated at the second conference
be followed. s The companies refused to include all their proper-
ties in one negotiation effort and made separate proposals for
each location.8 9 The companies did make final offers to the tra-
ditional negotiating units before the June 30 termination date
amounting to about $ .50 per hour,90 but the unions claimed that
the companies made no further efforts to bargain and that they
were guilty of a concerted refusal to bargain.9 1 This, of course,
prompted the 26-union coalition strike against the copper indus-
try,92 which the companies believed was due to impossible de-
mands-industry-wide bargaining and coordinated bargaining.9 3
The strike lasted from July, 1967, until March, 1968. Although
many charges and counter-charges were made during the strike,
there are at least three possible explanations for the strike. One
explanation is that this was truly a union attempt to gain com-
pany-wide or even industry-wide bargaining;9 4 another explana-
income security, group insurance, more vacations and holidays, changes
in the length of agreements and pension plan modifications. One
company measured the total cost at $2.85 per hour or about four times
the increase gained by the UAW with Ford Motor Company in the
same time period. The unions would have priced the total package at
something around $2.00 per hour. See W. CHEaNis, supra note 74, at
181-82.
87. W. CENmiSr, supra note 74, at 182.
88. Id. at 183.
89. Timmins, supra note 74, at 31.
90. W. CHERNisH, supra note 74, at 184.
91. Timmins, supra note 74, at 31.
92. Chernish believes that the Industrial Union Department was
the major factor behind the ability of the unions to gain such power in
the early bargaining stages. He claims that the representatives as-
signed by the coalition took away the power of local union officials to
conduct bargaining and therefore pushed the coalition issue to the
forefront leaving other issues secondary. He also believes that the
unions failed to engage in meaningful bargaining until after the strike
began, thereby allowing more unions to join the strike, and thus
strengthening the unions' bargaining position. W. CHEvmsw, supra
note 74, at 185.
93. Timins, supra note 74, at 32. A typical statement was that
the negotiations were developed to provide for an industry-wide settle-
ment rather than a settlement for a particular company's employees.
94. Chernish and industry management take this view.
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tion stresses that this was a union effort to win the highest wel-
fare and benefit package in the history of copper mining and an
effort by the Steelworkers to show the way to industrial influ-
ence; 95 finally, the unions claimed that the strike resulted because
of management's insistence "on treating labor as a competitive
cost and trying to gain or retain an advantage in labor cost over
their competitors." 96 The strike itself had nation-wide economic
repercussions as it crippled the economies of several states and
communities. As the strike gained momentum, several remedial
measures were suggested.
An original aim of the coalition, it has been suggested, was
the invocation of the Taft-Hartley emergency provisions for an
80-day cooling-off period. 97 The use of this remedy would bene-
fit the unions in two ways: it would allow the unions to present
to the government an industry-wide approach to bargaining; it
would also allow the early strikers to work until the end of the
80-day period when the remaining contracts would expire and
all could go on strike.98 The Government declined to use the
Taft-Hartley provisions on the grounds that its invocation was of
questionable legality, and that there was no reasonable expecta-
tion of settlement within the 80-day period. Pressure mounted
for compulsory arbitration, but the manufacturers believed that
this would destroy collective bargaining by putting the determi-
nation of labor costs on third parties thus allowing undue gov-
ernmental interference.9 9 The governors of the affected states,
although playing a peripheral role, suggested a fact-finding board
for invoking Taft-Hartley but this was not acted upon. 10° In
November, 1967, after five months of striking, several senators
appealed to President Johnson to name a fact-finding board to
seek a settlement. The Steelworkers were in favor but the com-
panies of the industry opposed the proposal.' 0 1 In late January,
1968, the President announced the appointment of a three man
fact-finding panel to uncover the core of the dispute and to act
as mediators in settling the dispute. The union approved, as
95. Timmins would tend to focus on this as the reason for the
strike. See Timmins, supra note 74, at 33.
96. J. Molony, supra note 77, at 66.
97. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 206-
10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1964).
98. W. CHERNMSH, supra note 74, at 187.
99. Timmins, supra note 74, at 32-33.
100. W. CHERNISH, supra note 74, at 188.
101. Id. at 190-91. The companies declined the endorsement be-
lieving that its legitimization would put too much stress on the coali-
tion demand of company-wide bargaining.
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did the copper producers, who expressed reservations. 0 2 The
panel found the real problem to be that of company-wide bargain-
ing and recommended that the parties scrap the issue of company-
wide bargaining and negotiate the other issues within three
groupings separated by the work done and product manufac-
tured.103
Finally, on March 16, eight months after the start of the
strike, the first contract was ratified by the Steelworkers-the
locals of the Arizona mining operations of Phelps Dodge and
another refinery covered by a single contract. The agreement
was for approximately $1.13 per hour for 40 months. Thereafter,
other contracts were signed.10 4
An analysis of the negotiated settlements after the strike re-
veals that both sides won and lost. The unions won wage and
fringe benefit packages valued at approximately $1.00 per hour,
with some even more than this. 0 5 This, the union claimed, rep-
resented an increase of more than twice the size of any ever ne-
gotiated in the past, and the improvements were claimed to be
about three times as good as any of the offers made by the com-
panies before the strike. 0 6 In copper mining, smelting and re-
fining operations and on brass fabricating properties, wage pack-
ages from $ .51 to $ .57 per hour were provided.10 -
102. Id. at 191-92.
103. Id. at 194. The three groupings were copper mining, smelting
and refining; production of other nonferrous metals, and copper wire
and cable and brass fabrication.
104. Id. at 195-96.
105. Steelworkers 1968 Report on Collective Bargaining-Nonferrous
Metals. Chernish estimates the packages at $.70-$1.04 per hour. See
W. CHERNmH, supra note 74, at 200.
106. Steelworkers 1968 Report on Collective Bargaining-Nonferrous
Metals.
107. Id. This figure includes across-the-board raises, increment
increases and wage restructuring programs. By the effective date of
the last increment increases, the minimum rate at the large producers
will be $2.98 per hour, the maximum being $4.44 per hour for some
properties. There also were other significant benefits. The pension
programs now run concurrently with the agreement and expire at the
same time. They provide basic monthly benefits of $5.00 per year of
service without limitation on credited service, and full pension after
30 years of service at age 60 supplemented by $130 per month until
the pensioner is eligible for Social Security. Also included were pen-
sions for widows of workers who die before retirement if after the age
of 55 and with ten years of service; $100 monthly minimum benefit for
disability pensions; pensions vesting after ten years of service, and
monthly benefits of $3.50 per year of service for employees already re-
tired. One of the major improvements claimed was the new or im-
proved Supplementary Unemployment Benefit plan providing laid-off
workers with $25 per week for the first 26 weeks and $50 per week for
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However, the major demands of the coalition as far as com-
mon terms are concerned were not achieved. The union admitted
that although common termination dates within each company
were not achieved, the widely scattered contract expiration dates
were narrowed. A June 30, 1971 date was standardized through-
out the industry for the expiration of copper contracts; a Sep-
tember 30, 1971 expiration date was set for the brass operations
of Anaconda, Kennecott and the Federated Metals Division of
American Smelting, and the lead-zinc properties of that company
have contracts terminating on December 31, 1971.108 No single
contract covering an entire company was signed and no single
economic package was extended across the operations of a partic-
ular company, 100 but the unions felt that a great victory had
been won even though the major coalition effort failed.
In retrospect, several conclusions can be drawn. First, it
seems clear that the coordinated effort by the unions led to a
larger economic package than would have been bargained had
each of the unions gone its separate way. Although losing
on the single contract issue, and also on the common termi-
nation date issue, the unions by means of the joint strike tactic
did have a substantial effect on the final economic package. Sec-
ond, it is evident that the collective bargaining process com-
pletely broke down for the full period of the strike. This led to
the prolonged strike and provoked agitation for third-party and
governmental intervention. Whether the unions had hoped for
intervention or not, it is evident that such intervention would
have given them an excellent opportunity to promote the virtues
of coordinated-coalition bargaining. Third, it is evident that the
issue of coordinated-coalition bargaining, if demanded at the bar-
gaining table, will be resisted to the end by employers and may
thus lead to prolonged strikes which may or may not have severe
repercussions on the economy. If the impact on the economy is
extreme, governmental intervention is likely to result.
The effect of a prolonged strike on the public is by no means
minimal. The effects of this strike attest to this. The settlement
the second 26 weeks and a retirement, death, and disability program
providing for five months pay. The retirement, death, and disability
programs were "firsts" for Anaconda workers. Improvements were also
claimed in the equalization of health and welfare coverage at the vari-
ous properties, employee contributions to the plan having been elimi-
nated. Weekly sickness and accident benefits of $75 to $80 for 52 weeks,
applicable to the first day of hospitalized illness, became standard in
the industry. Id.
108. Id.
109. W. CHERNisH, supra note 74, at 200.
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forced a price increase in copper at a time when price increases
were discouraged. The strike impaired the balance of payments
by $500 to $700 million. It caused a loss of wages of about $215
million, a loss of about $300 million in profits, $120 million in
federal taxes, $6.2 million in strike benefits and inestimable dam-
age to state and local economies." 0 Finally, a great deal of litiga-
tion was generated by the union tactics in the copper strike.
Kennecott Copper brought section 8 (b) (3) charges against the
unions based on the alleged efforts of ten internationals and
other locals to bargain with Kennecott on a company-wide basis.
Kennecott initially had bargained separately with a total of five
bargaining units-its Western Copper properties, its lead and
zinc facilities in Utah and Missouri (two units-Ozark and Tintic)
and its facilities for refining and fabricating copper located in
Maryland and Missouri (two units-Chase and KRC). The trial
examiner found that as a precondition to agreement for the
Western Copper Properties that the unions demanded: (1) com-
mon contract expiration dates for all agreements; (2) a company-
wide economic package applied to all units, and (3) a rule that
contract settlement be achieved at all union-represented units
before work resumed at any of the units. This was held to vio-
late section 8 (b) (3) of the Act, on the ground that allowance of
the union demands would have meant a merger of separate bar-
gaining units contrary to the rule that with nonmandatory sub-
jects of bargaining "neither party may attempt to force upon the
other enlargement of an establishment unit ...."I"
The trial examiner reached a similar result in the AFL-CIO
Joint Negotiating Commitee (Phelps-Dodge) case."12  The trial
examiner's decision in this case, however, was appealed to the
Board which affirmed his decision.1 3 The unions tried to dis-
tinguish this case from the Kennecott case, where the trial ex-
aminer had found that the unions in the Western Copper Proper-
ties of Kennecott were insisting that they negotiate terms and
conditions applicable to other properties. The unions tried to
show that although they originally requested joint bargaining
on a company-wide basis and requested a master contract for all
110. Id. at 200-01.
111. United Steelworkers (Kennecott Copper Corp.), Case No. 27-
CB-453, BNA, Daily Lab. Rep. No. 27 D-1 (Feb. 10, 1969). This decision
became a Board order when the unions failed to file exceptions within
the prescribed period of time.
112. See Daily Labor Rep. No. 135-Dl (July 15, 1969).
113. AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating Committee (Phelps Dodge), 184
N.LJR.B. No. 106, 74 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1970).
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of the company's properties, when Phelps Dodge refused such
requests, they agreed to negotiate in five locations for separate
agreements." 4
A majority of the Board found that one of the primary goals
of the AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating Committee was company-wide
bargaining and that "the strikes conducted ... were intended, in
substantial part, to force the Charging Party to accede to the Re-
spondents' demands for such a companywide agreement." ' , To
reach this result, the Board relied on the bargaining objectives
formulated in the "1967 Nonferrous Bargaining Policy Goals," the
record of negotiations as a whole,1 6 statements from the re-
spondent's authorized publications and statements by Nonferrous
Coordinating Committee members before the Secretaries of Labor
and Commerce that company-wide bargaining was a major factor
in the copper strike." 7 The Board went on to hold, "The conduct
of negotiations on a basis broader than the established bargaining
unit is nonmandatory, and the Respondents' insistence that the
Charging Party engage in such bargaining was violative of the
Act.,uls
114. Brief for Respondents at 33-37, AFL-CIO Joint Negotiating
Committee (Phelps-Dodge), 184 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 74 L.R.R.M. 1705
(1970).
115. 184 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 74 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1706 (1970).
116. It is here that the lone dissenter, Member Brown, differs from
the majority. He noted that after Phelps Dodge rejected the proposal
for extending negotiations to all of the properties of Phelps Dodge,
bargaining continued on traditional lines. 74 L.R.R.M. at 1708. Even
after the traditional bargaining resumed, however, the respondents de-
manded common expiration dates for all agreements, a limited no-
strike clause allowing employees at the Arizona mines to strike if a
lawful strike were in progress at other operations of the company and a
"most favored nations" clause which would allow adoption of a more
favorable provision bargained for in any other contract covering opera-
tions of Phelps Dodge or any of its subsidiaries. After these demands
were dropped, the respondents insisted on simultaneous settlements at
other bargaining units before signature of any agreement at the Arizona
operations, and that no contract for the Arizona operations be signed
until the Nonferrous Industry Conference approved the contract. This
approval did not occur until agreement had been reached at the other
properties. Id.
The majority argued that the aforementioned in toto manifested an
attempt to enlarge the bargaining unit by merging the bargaining in
separate units. 74 L.R.R.M. at 1707 n.7. Member Brown argued that to
conclude that any of these demands "are equitable [sic] to a demand
for a single master contract applicable to all locations is a non sequi-
tur. . . ." Id. at 1709. He also argued that barring a no-strike clause,
supportive strikes are legal, no-strike clauses and expiration dates are
bargainable subjects and that a "most favored nations" clause may be
a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. at 1709-10.
117. 184 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 74 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1706 (1970).
118. Id. at 1706-07.
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The ultimate question to be determined by this example is
whether the benefits derived from an uncontrolled and free sys-
tem of collective bargaining, as described above, match the costs
to the public and third parties who are injured because of it. As
the copper strike illustrates, the stakes are very high for labor to
push coordinated-coalition bargaining and for management to
resist to the point of total impasse. However, the greatest im-
pact may fall on innocent third parties who are adversely af-
fected by such strikes.
B. COORDmNATED-COALrTIoN BARGAINING AT GENERAL ELECTRIc
If any company was to be chosen because of its experience
with coordinated-coalition bargaining, it would be General Elec-
tric. More litigation and animosity has developed in bargaining
at General Electric than any other company of its size.
General Electric is the fourth largest corporation in the
United States and the largest electrical manufacturing company
in the world, with gross income from sales and services in 1966
of nearly $7.2 billion and net income of nearly $340 million. In
1968, sales reached $8.4 billion and net income approached $360
million. Because of the strike in the industry, sales in 1969
reached only $8.5 billion, and net income dropped to $278 mil-
lion. 119 The Company employs about 400,000 people 120 at 159
plants in 129 cities, at service locations, warehouses and offices
throughout the nation.
The labor relations policies of the Company have caused seri-
ous problems. General Electric's approach to collective bargain-
ing was influenced by a former Vice-president, Lemuel R. Boul-
ware, who advocated that the Company research the problems of
its employee relations and after making a complete examination,
make what it believes to be a fair and firm offer.'2 1  This of
course means that the Company considers the demands of the
union, but rarely moves from its original position, believing that
its first offer is fair and equitable. Unions have looked at "Boul-
warism" as a negation of collective bargaining and therefore il-
legal under the Labor Management Relations Act. They main-
119. STAA & PooR's, STANDA.n N.Y.S.E. STocK RPOaTS, No. 162,
966 (Aug. 21, 1970).
120. FORTUNE, May 1970, at 184-85.
121. -See Northrup, Boulwarism v. Coalitionism--the 1966 GE negotia-
tions, in MANAGEMENT OF PERSONNEL QUARTEMLY, Bureau of Industrial Re-
lations (1966) at 2-11; L. BOULWARE, THE TRUTH ABOUT BouLvAus1:
TRYING To Do RIGHT VOLUNTARILY (1969).
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tain that it is a policy "to portray the company as the sole de-
fender of the workers' economic interests," "a deliberate effort to
bypass or circumvent the union at all levels" and a "technique
which comprises many ostensible negotiations sessions prior to
the expiration of the contract . . . after which the company un-
veils one comprehensive offer, covering all the points on which it
chooses to respond, and from which it refuses to deviate in any
meaningful way.' 22  The courts have found General Electric
guilty of unfair labor practices in the use of "Boulwarism."'
23
The real question, however, is how General Electric was able to
maintain this type of bargaining relationship for such a long
period of time, when most of the company's employees are un-
ionized. 24 One of the answers is that before 1966 disunity and
antagonism were prevalent among the unions bargaining with
General Electric. 25 Until 1966, there was little if any communi-
cation among the unions. Because of this, General Electric could
hold separate talks with each union, and in many cases each in-
dividual local unit of a union. Since General Electric bargains
with over 80 unions at 150 locations, this allowed the company's
"divide-and-conquer" tactics to become an effective defense to the
strike mechanism.
26
Traditionally, bargaining between the International Union of
122. Handbook on the 1969-1970 Strike Against General Electric
(AFL-CIO 1969) at 15-16. [hereinafter cited as Handbook].
123. NLRB v. General Electric Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969). The
court was called upon to review the findings of the NLRB that General
Electric had violated the NLRA in the 1960 negotiations by refusing to
furnish the union necessary information, presenting an offer on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis and dealing with the IUE through the local unions
and its membership rather than the membership through the IUE.
The court found that "Boulwarism" had two major facets:
1) A take-it-or-leave-it approach to negotiations empha-
sizing the powerlessness and uselessness of the Union to its
members, and
2) A communications program picturing the Company as
the true defender of employee interests, denigrating the Union,
and curbing the Company's ability to change its own position.
Id. at 756.
124. The International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Work-
ers (IUE) has filed refusal-to-bargain charges against the company as a
part of each negotiation since 1954.
125. The major unions bargaining with General Electric are the
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Inter-
national Assoc. of Machinists, UAW, Allied Industrial Workers, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Sheet Metal Workers Inter-
national and Alliance, American Federation of Technical Employees,
American Flint Glass Workers, United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, Teamsters, Steelworkers and Pattern Makers League of North
America.
126. Handbook, supra note 122, at 16-17.
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Electrical4 Radio and Machine Workers (IUE) and General Elec-
tric was nationwide, General Electric negotiating with the TUE on
items such as general wage increases, employee benefits and ar-
bitration. Local supplements covering local conditions not cov-
ered in the national agreement were negotiated between local
management and the union.12 7 The IUE, however, was one of
the few unions bargaining that had a national contract; -12 8 the
others bargained exclusively with local management.
1. The 1966 IUE-General Electric Negotiations
In 1966 a significant change occurred when the Committee on
Collective Bargaining (CCB) was formed. This unit consisted of
the presidents of seven international unions.12 9 The function of
the CCB was to coordinate activities among the various unions
and to make them agree on common goals in the upcoming nego-
tiations with General Electric. To accomplish this, the CCB
pooled its resources and enlisted the aid of the AFL-CIO in estab-
lishing a teletype network of its own to counteract that of Gen-
eral Electric. The effort by the unions was endorsed by the In-
dustrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO and was aided by
its personnel
On March 15, 1966, the CCB held a rally in Washington, D.C.,
at which some 300 delegates attended and pledged mutual support
for each other in their upcoming negotiations with General Elec-
tric. The agreement listed a series of economic' 30 and non-
economic' 31 issues which the unions intended to press jointly.
Following this rally, the presidents of the coordinating un-
ions requested an informal meeting with General Electric but
were refused. Since joint meetings were impossible, the IUE
wrote to General Electric on April 13, stating that the Union
would abandon further requests for joint meetings. After this
response, the Company agreed to a meeting. The meeting, ar-
127. W. CHER rsa, CoAL oN BARcnNG 82 (199).
128. The United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers and Pat-
tern Makers League also had national bargaining agreements.
129. The IUE, International Ass'n of Machinists, UAW, Allied In-
dustrial Workers of America, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Alliance and American Federation of
Technical Employees.
130. Included were national bargaining goals for wages, holidays
and vacations and income and employment security. See W. CHM-
NisH, supra note 127, at 87 for the complete demands.
131. Included were arbitration issues, full union shop, automation
provisions, continuity of service, an anti-discrimination clause and pen-
sion and insurance programs. See id.
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ranged for May 4, never convened because when the IUE negoti-
ating committee appeared, including representatives of the other
ten unions, General Electric left, claiming that they had not
agreed to a joint meeting.13 2 After this meeting had failed, a
series of legal battles erupted. The union charged General Elec-
tric with a failure to bargain; General Electric, in turn, filed
counter-charges that the 11 unions and the Steering Committee
were engaged in an illegal conspiracy to bring about coordinated-
coalition bargaining.1 33  The Company lost the legal battle and
had to settle for an IUE committee which included representa-
tives of the other ten unions. 3 4  The negotiations also brought
governmental intervention as the October 1st and 2nd contract
deadlines with General Electric approached, due in part to a Sep-
tember 28, CCB conference at which the membership of the 11
unions agreed that if no agreement had been reached by October
2nd, they would shut down 90 percent of the General Electric
plants. 1 5 The Johnson Administration was determined to re-
quest a Taft-Hartley injunction if negotiations did break down in
order to prevent interruption of General Electric's defense pro-
duction. When, however, Mr. Meany, President of the AFL-CIO,
protested to President Johnson on the use of Taft-Hartley, John-
son requested that strike action be deferred for 14 days and that
a presidential panel be appointed to assist the Federal Mediation
132. For opposing viewpoints on this meeting compare W. CnEa-
NIsH, supra note 127, at 90-92 with Lasser, Union Review of Coordina-
tion at GE and Westinghouse, THE AM. FEDMATIONIST 13 (April 1967).
133. W. CHERNISH, supra note 127, at 92-96; Lasser, supra note 132,
at 17.
134. See W. CHERNISH, supra note 127, at 96-102. The company re-
fused to accept coordinated bargaining for the following reasons:
1) General Electric was convinced that the basic strategy
of the union coalition was to present a "united front" for reject-
ing any company proposals to force a company-wide strike.
2) General Electric believes in negotiating in a forthright
manner holding nothing back simply to be able to make last-
minute, strike-threat concessions;
3) The coalition is merely a strike-broadening and strike-
lengthening tactic benefiting no one;
4) General Electric believes the long-term strategy of the
coalition is to bring about industry-wide bargaining in the elec-
trical industry;
5) Coalition leaders want to shatter the. wage guidepost;
6) The strike-bound coalition intends to force govern-
mental intervention by refusing to bargain;
7) Centralized negotiations will make local strikes over
local issues more prevalent; and
8) General Electric has had a 33-year bargaining history of
sound and peaceful contract settlements unmatched by any
other major manufacturing concern. For the legal arguments
presented see notes 25-39 supra and accompanying text.
135. Lasser, supra note 132, at 16.
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and Conciliation Service in reaching an agreement. 130 This was
agreed to by both parties, and settlement was reached on October
16 shortly before the end of the 14-day period.
In reaching agreement, the unions claimed that because of co-
ordination significant benefits were attained. They noted that
the 1966 agreements were better than either of the two preceding
contracts-the annual wage increase was on a more adequate
level, a partial cost-of-living escalator was negotiated and in-
equity adjustments for day, skilled and salaried workers were
established. The final agreement, covering 36 months and 3
weeks, increased the value of the earlier offers by 5 to 7 cents per
hour. 37 Finally, the unions claimed "[t]he most far-reaching re-
sult was membership recognition that coordinated bargaining,
in spite of its complexities and difficulties, has completely proved
itself and must continue as a permanent feature of GE and West-
inghouse negotiations."' 38
The Company disagreed with the unions' contentions claim-
ing that the economic package negotiated was geared to market
conditions and that nothing bargained was an unusual departure
from previous General Electric policies. The Company claimed
success in one battle-no significant change was made in altering
General Electric's limited arbitration of grievances. The Com-
pany was unwilling, however, to say flatly that coordination had
been ineffective. 3 9
2. The 1969 IUE-General Electric Negotiations
After the 1966 negotiations, the IUE was convinced that co-
ordinated bargaining would be followed in later negotiations
with General Electric. Objectives for the second round of coor-
dinated bargaining with General Electric were disclosed at a
meeting on March 6, 1969, in which the ten AFL-CIO unions' 4 0
making up the Coordinated Bargaining Committee (CBC) par-
ticipated. Of the issues and demands made by the CBC, the fol-
lowing were the most important:
a. Wages-The committee claimed that the value of the 12.4
percent wage and fringe package increase of October, 1966, had
136. Id. at 18.
137. Id. at 19. Pension, insurance and vacation benefits were also
claimed to have been improved.
138. Id.
139. W. CHERN sH, supra note 127, at 103-04.
140. The UE, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Machinists, Steelworkers, Sheet Metal Workers, Technical Engineers,
Allied Industrial Unions, Carpenters, Plumbers, and Flint Glass Workers.
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been cut to 3.1 percent by inflation. The committee asked for a
cents-per-hour wage increase based on the increase in the cost of
living, increased productivity and wage settlements in other in-
dustries. This would mean something over 7.5 percent during
the first contract year.141
b. Union Shop-The committee demanded a full union shop
for all employees. 142
c. Pensions-This was a major issue to the CBC because
they felt that General Electric employees were receiving sub-
stantially less than other major industries such as the auto in-
dustry, the aircraft industry and basic steel. They asked for a
minimum pension benefit of $7.50 per month per year of ser-
vice.143
d. Arbitration-This was one of the Company's major claims
to victory in 1966; the CBC demanded a full unrestricted arbitra-
tion clause.1 44
On May 14, almost six months prior to contract expiration,
negotiators for the IUE Coordinated Bargaining Committee met
with General Electric officials in two subcommittees, one dealing
with contract language, the other with pensions and insurance.
However, the value of these meetings was lessened by General
Electric's insistence that the subcommittee work had to be re-
peated during full-scale negotiations. When full-scale talks be-
gan, almost five months passed without any sort of compro-
mise. 45
On October 7, after a long period of relative inactivity, Gen-
eral Electric presented what it termed "the best offer in its his-
tory" to the IUE. The General Electric offer consisted of a gen-
eral increase of 20 cents per hour the first year without provi-
sions for wage increases in the second or third years and no
141. Coordinated Bargaining Committee, Issues and Answers (AFL-
CIO 1969) at 3.
142. Id. at 4-5.
143. Id. at 14-17.
144. Id. at 19. Among other benefits, the committee demanded
vacation pay to be paid at 25 percent above the employees' average
earnings and a vacation schedule giving a minimum of two weeks for
one year of service and a maximum of six weeks for 25 years of service.
There was also a demand to eliminate employee contributions in
financing group insurance and health plans and to have the plans apply
to all retirement. Finally, the committee demanded that sickness and
accident benefits be raised to two-thirds of gross pay for 52 weeks, the
elimination of all area wage differentials, and job protection and trans-
fer. Id. at 7-13.
145. Eandbook, supra note 122, at 6.
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cost of living protection of any kind. The Company instead pro-
posed wage reopeners in 1970 and 1971.146 The IUE, in the mean-
time, had demanded a total of $1.40 per hour in a 30-month con-
tract, a one cent cost of living increase for every 0.4 percent rise
in the price level, and a five cent per employee per hour fund to
eliminate geographical wage differentials. 147
The General Electric offer was rejected unanimously by the
IUE negotiating committee, the IUE Conference Board and the
12 internationals of the CBC. General Electric refused to move
from its original position after the IUE committee reduced certain
economic proposals and presented other counter-proposals on Oc-
tober 21. On October 25, the unions tried to avert a strike by
proposing that the bargaining issues be presented to the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association. This was unsuccessful as was an ef-
fort by the Federal Mediation Service to have the parties meet
in one last effort to avert a strike.148 The strike began on Octo-
ber 26, 1969, when the existing agreement expired. Nearly 150,000
members of 13 unions at 150 plants in 33 states went on
strike.149 On December 6, General Electric revised its first pro-
posal, offering general increases of three percent for wage re-
openers in the second and third year, but no improvement in
first-year wage proposals. General Electric also offered a cost-
of-living provision to raise wages one-half percent for each addi-
tional one percent increase in the Consumer Price Index after the
first one percent increase, and to raise the minimum pension
benefit to $5.25 on January 1, 1971, and to $5.50 a year later.1 0
The union rejected the offer as inadequate and the strike and
boycott continued. After a month of stalemate, movement to-
ward settlement came when federal mediator J. Curtis Counts
joined the talks. From January 8 to January 29, General Elec-
tric made some small improvements on its December 6 offer, but
the strike continued.' 51
146. Letter containing offer from John IL Baldwin, chief General
Electric negotiator, to John H. Shambo, Chairman of the IUE-GE
Conference Board, October 7, 1969, in BNA CoLLEcTIVE BARGAnnN,-
NEGonALONS AND CoNTRACTs 12:125 (Oct. 16, 1969).
147. Handbook, supra note 122, at 4.
148. Id. at 6-7.
149. The strike lasted 14 weeks and was supplemented by a na-
tionwide AFL-CIO campaign to raise $1.00 from each member of the
121 AFL-CIO national and international unions to support the strikers,
and a nationwide consumer boycott against General Electric products
which began on Nov. 28, 1969.
150. Coordinated Bargaining Committee Progress Report, Dec. 7,
1969.
151. IUE News, Feb. 4, 1970, at 3. During the three weeks of media-
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After three months of striking, the IUE and General Electric
reached tentative agreement on January 29. The major elements
of victory claimed by IUE President Jennings consisted of $ .50
in hourly wage increases and a $ .21 maximum in future cost of
living gains for all bargaining unit members at all locations; a
new minimum pension of $6.50 per month for each year of serv-
ice, estimated to be worth about seven cents of the total agree-
ment; improvements valued at ten cents per hour in sick leave,
health insurance, and the elimination of the insurance contribu-
tion, and $.05 to .25 adjustments for skilled workers. 15 2 The agree-
ment represented a 19 cent increase in wages and a $.05 in-
crease in pension benefits over the December 6 Company offer.
The total value of the wage and fringe benefits was estimated to
be over $1.00, or 7.5 percent per year.153
Although both sides claimed victory, there was some degree
of pessimism from both the Company and the unions. The un-
ions heralded the outcome of the strike and the impact the strike
had upon General Electric' 54 but also noted that there was a
great deal of friction and failure of communications between the
coordinating unions involved in the negotiations.' 55 The Com-
pany admitted that the agreement was inflationary but was
pleased that the final package was possibly less costly than the
original offer with two reopeners. The Company also succeeded
in preserving management rights, and preventing the establish-
ment of new bargaining patterns in the industry. 5 6 The Com-
pany claimed that the coalition of unions sought a strike to dem-
onstrate its effectiveness, and that to carry out this intention,
the solution for the unions was not to bargain seriously but to
"delay-first in actual bargaining, then through almost endless
and patience-exhausting harping on non-economic issues" carry
on the facade of collective bargaining.'5 7  The greatest victory
claimed by the IUE was that "Boulwarism" was finally defeated
tion, only two face-to-face meetings were held, one on Jan. 15 and the
other during the final week of negotiations.
152. Id. at 1-3.
153. Id.
154. Compton, Victory at GE: How It Was Done, THE AM. FED-
ERATIONIST 1-2 (July 1970).
155. Id. at 8.
156. Address of E.S. Willis, General Electric's chief negotiator on
employee benefits at a meeting of the American Pension Conference,
March, 1970, in Management Review of Coordination at GE, BNA COL-
LEcTIVE BARGAINING-NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 14:71, 74 (July 23,
1970) [hereinafter cited as Address].
157. Id. at 72.
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-President Jennings stated, "Our members have nailed shut the
casket of Boulwarism."' 5 8
Although it is unclear to what extent, if any, coordinated
bargaining played a role in achieving national goals or company-
wide goals for all the unions in the CBC, it does seem clear
that coordination and cooperation by the CBC caused the strike
against General Electric to be more complete and therefore more
effective. 59 The cooperation received from fellow laborers in
the consumer boycott against General Electric and the one dollar
per person strike fund also added to the strike's effectiveness.
Without the coordination achieved by the CBC, it seems likely
that General Electric could have maintained its historic "divide-
and-conquer" tactics, and its "Boulwaristic" approach to labor
relations. This would have put the unions in their traditionally
weak positions. Although many of the goals of the March 6, CBC
meeting were not attained, the unions involved in the CBC can
claim success in abolishing or at least weakening the effects of
"Boulwarism," after General Electric Board Chairman Fred
Borch had announced that GE's December 6 offer would not be
improved. Coordination at General Electric, then, may be said
to have had some effect on the overall functioning of collective
bargaining by introducing "give-and-take" bargaining into the
labor relations of the company. This may have the beneficial
effect of lessening the labor tensions at General Electric. How-
ever, the costs of the strike were considerable. Employees lost
over a quarter of a billion dollars in wages, the company lost
even more in sales, and profits were reduced considerably."60
IV. CONCLUSION
Although it is risky to state any definite conclusions as to
the effects of coordinated-coalition bargaining based on the
small sampling of case studies presented in this Note, several
general conclusions can be drawn from the facts surrounding
the two studies made. First, it seems clear that the attempt to
broaden the bargaining unit by the unions composing the coordi-
nated-coalition bargaining scheme has had some impact on the
final settlement reached between the company and the unions in-
158. UE News, Feb. 4, 1970, at 3. The response from General
Electric was equally predictable: "The unions could claim Boulwar-
ism was buried just as it was announced in 1966. I am sure they will
resurrect it and then re-bury it in 1973." Address, supra note 156, at 74.
159. See Address, supra note 156.
160. Id. at 71.
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volved. The impact appears to be 1) that the final negotiated
agreement has been larger than in the absence of coordinated-
coalition bargaining and 2) that the unions' attempts to expand
the bargaining unit and to create wage and bargaining uniform-
ity throughout a company or industry have been relatively un-
successful.
Second, to the extent that coordinated-coalition bargaining
stresses industry-wide issues such as wage and bargaining uni-
formity, purely local issues have played a decreasing role in the
collective bargaining process. This may tend to aggravate local
tensions, making it more difficult for union leaders and em-
ployers to sell agreements to locals. Third, employers faced with
the prospect of union demands for expanded bargaining units
and wage and fringe benefit uniformity throughout a company
or market have resisted, and in resisting, have been willing to set-
tle for lengthier and better managed strikes on an industry- and
company-wide level. At the same time, however, employers
have increased the number of suits brought against unions for
unfair labor practices, and at the same time, have increased the
time and money spent in lobbying for legislative reform against
these union practices.
Finally, the stress placed by unions on market-wide wage
and benefit uniformity and the resistance that employers have
created, have seriously affected the public and other third par-
ties. First, lengthy strikes have not only crippled needed produc-
tion of vital national goods, but have also reduced corporate
and wage income, thereby reducing taxable income in staggering
amounts. Moreover, as the case study of the copper industry
illustrates, state and local economies have been severely damaged.
The large totals of lost production, corporate and wage income
and taxable income have brought into focus the important ques-
tion of whether restrictions should be placed upon the system of
free collective bargaining as it presently functions. Second, it
appears that during these lengthy strikes, the collective bar-
gaining process, instead of operating to reach settlement, has
completely broken down, and interested third-party interme-
diaries increasingly have had to play the dominant role in forc-
ing the parties to agreement. Not only is this expensive, but
valuable talent is wasted. The whole theory of free collective
bargaining becomes meaningless and useless if the interested par-
ties are unable to reach an accord without third-party inter-
vention.
Although it now appears that the NLRB and courts are pay-
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ing more attention to the basic facts and realities arising out of
employers' assertions of union unfair labor practices in coalition
bargaining, rather than relying on the technical distinctions
that the law makes between legality and illegality,"" the Board
and the courts are nevertheless hamstrung in assessing and
weighing the economic strengths of each side.102 Consequently,
no matter how coercive an economic weapon may be to the
other interested bargainer or interested third parties, as long as
the actions are "legal" within the purview of the Act, the Board
or court may not interfere.
While this may be a proper role for the Board and courts to
assume, it is incumbent upon Congress to legislate to protect
adequately the public interest there is in seeing that industrial
strife is kept to a minimum so that the public does not become the
major cost-bearer of industrial strife.
161. See notes 111-18 supra and accompanying text.
162. See American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300
(1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
